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ABSTRACT
According to the contract law principle established in the
famous nineteenth century English case of Hadleyv. Baxendale,
and followed ever since in the common law world,liability for a
breach of contract is limited to losses "arising...accordingto
the usual course of things," or thatmay be reasonably supposed
"to have been in the contemplation of both parties,at the time
they made the contract, ..."Usinga formal model, we attempt in
this paper to analyze systematically the effects andthe
efficiency of this limitation on contract damages. Westudy two
alternative rules: the limited liability rule ofHadley, and an
unlimited liability rule. Our analysis focuseson the effects of
the alternative rules on two types of decisions:buyers'
decisions about communicating their valuations ofperformance to
sellers; and sellers' decisions about their level of precautions
to reduce the likelihood of nonperforinance. We identify the
efficient behavior of buyers and sellers. We thencompare this
efficient behavior with the decisions that buyers andsellers in
fact make under the limited and unlimitedliability rules. This
analysis enables us to provide a full characterization of the
conditions under which each of the rules induces,or fails to
induce, efficient behavior, as well as the conditions under which
each of the rules is superior to the other.
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Harvard Law School Harvard Law School
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Cambridge, MA 02138 Cambridge, MA 02138 and and NEER NBERI. INTRODUCTION
A promisor will often lack knowledge of the value ofcontract
performance unless the promisee communicates it to him. Thiswas the
situation in the well known nineteenth century Englishcase of Hadley
u.Baxendale.' In that case Hadley, a millowner, engaged Baxendale,
a carrier, to transport a broken engine shaft to another city bya
certain date. The value to Hadley of performancewas much greater
than ordinary because the broken shaft was toserve as a model for a
new one without which his mill could not operate. But Hadley did not
tell this to Baxendale, and he therefore hadno reason to take special
precautions to ensure timely delivery.2 As it happened, Baxendale
'9Ex. 341, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854)
2The opinion states, 156 Eng. Rep. at151, "we find that the only
circumstances here communicated...were, that the article to be carried
was the broken shaft of a mill," but what actually transpired is not
entirely straightforward; see Danzig (l975:251,262,n.53). OnFriday,
May 13th, 1854, the Hadley brothers, proprietors of City Flour Mills of
Gloucester, sent an employee to Pickford & Company, acommon carrier
of which Baxendale was managing director, toinquire about shipment
of the broken shaft to Joyce & Co., manufacturers of the mill'ssteam
engine, in Greenwich. The Hadley employee told the Pickfordagent
that the mill was stopped and that the shaft must besent immediately.
The Pickford agent said that if the shaftwere brought in by noon any
day, it would be delivered to Greenwich the following day. The next
day, Saturday, May 14th, the shaft was brought to Pickford's before
noon, and the Hadley employee requested that a special entry be made
to hasten delivery of the shaft, ifnecessary. But apparently this was
not done, and no special contract was made.
The question therefore arises whether Pickford's hada practice of
making special, higher-price contracts for assured delivery. In hope of
an answer, we contacted Prof. Gerard Turnbufl at the University of
Leeds, author of Pickford's 1720-1950: A Study in the Development of
Transportation (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Glasgow,
Scotland, 1970). He told us that to the best of his knowledge, no
1failed to convey the shaft by the specifieddate, delaying resumption of
the mill's operation.3
The general holding in this casewas that liability should be limited
to losses "arising...accordingto the usual course of things," or that
may be reasonably supposed "to have been in the contemplation of both
parties, at the time they made the contract, as the probable resultof
the breach of it."4 Inconsequence, the court said that Baxendale was
not liable for Hadley's lost profits; theywere the result of his unusual
circumstances and would not be reasonablysupposed to have been
contemplated by Baxendale. For Baxendale to be responsible for
Hadley's lost profits, the court stated that Hadley had to have
communicated his particular circumstances to Baxendaleat the time
that the contract was made.
This limitation on liability for breach ofcontract to the usual,
foreseeable, level of losses, unless the promisee had informed the
records of Pickford's, of its solicitors,or of its accountants now exist
that would tell whether Pickford's offeredspecial contracts for assured
delivery during the 1850's.
3Although the shaft was delivered to Pickford'son Saturday, May
14, and should have been delivered to Joyce &Co., Greenwich, on
Sunday, May 15 (see the previous note), in fact itwas not delivered
until Saturday, May 2 1st. The delaycame about as follows. The shaft
arrived in London, an intermediatepoint on its route, in good time, and
from there should normally havegone by rail to Greenwich. But the
shaft was kept in London for severaldays and sent instead by canal,
together with a consignment of iron goods, thatwas also bound for
Joyce & Co. See Danzig (1975:251). We surmise that itwas more
convenient for the Pickford agents in London totransport the shaft and
the iron goods together; andwe think it probable that in London, no
facts about the mill in Gloucesterwere known --whateverwas the
knowledge of the Pickford agent in Gloucester.
'See 156 Eng. Rep. at 151.
2promisor otherwise, has been accepted in the common law world.5It is,
as well, the rule in France.6 German law, however, proceeds fromthe
assumption that liability for losses is complete.7
We attempt in the present article to analyzesystematically the
effects and the relative efficiency of the foregoing limitedliability rule,
as opposed to the rule of unlimited liability for breach. To thisend, we
study a stylized model with buyers and sellers. A sellercan reduce the
likelihood of breach by taking precautions, but these willinvolve
additional expense or effort. There are two types ofbuyers, a minority
who place a high value on performance, and themajority who place a
low value on it.8 Whether a buyer placesa high or low valuation on
5See, for example, Calamari and Perillo (1987:14-5) and
Farnsworth (1982:12.14); and see also Corbin (1964:1OO7) and
Willjston (1968:1357).
6See Treitel (1976:82-9O) andvon Mehren (1982:113). It may be
noted that French law seems to have influenced the decision inHadky v.Bczxendale. The French code, which contained in three of its articles
the rule decided upon in Ha4leyv.Baxendale,wasmentioned favorably
in the opinion by Baron Parke, 156 Eng.Rep. at 147, "The sensible rule
appears to have been that laid down in France
7See Treitel (1976:*82,*91-92) andvon Mehren (1982:113). These
authors explain that German law tends to rejectforeseeability as a
limitation on liability, but that there is another limitationon it: A
party in breach will not be responsible for losses for which he was not
an "adequate cause," that is, for losses whose probability he did not
increase substantially. Nevertheless, weare told by those familiar with
German law that limitation of liability under theadequacy rubric is
less likely than under the French andcommon law systems.
8Although our main interest is in the assumption that high
valuation buyers are in the minority, we discuss also thecase in which
they are in the majority in note 27. We should observeas well that the
assumption that high valuation buyers are in the minoritymay be
regarded as an approximation to the truth: In reality, the values of
3performance is not observable to sellers. Buyers, however,may choose
to identify themselves, that is, make representations to the seller about
the value they place on performance. (As will be discussed, fora buyer
to identify himself as having low valuation will imply that the seller's
liability would be limited to such valuation.) The addition of such buyer
representations to the contracting process involves transaction costs,
which we will call "communication costs."
Accordingly, two types of decision are made in the model: buyers'
decisions about communication of their valuations; and sellers'
decisions about the level of precautions to reduce the likelihood of
nonperformance. We identify the decisions that are efficient for buyers
and sellers to make, and thencompare such decisions to the decisions
that the parties in fact make under the limited and unlimitedliability
rules for breach.
The gist of our conclusions from the model isas follows. First, if it
is efficient that sellers possess informationenabling them to
distinguish between buyers' types, then high valuation buyers alone
should communicate their valuation to sellers;buyers who do not
communicate will then be known by sellers to be of the low valuation
type. This way of transferring information minimizes transaction costs.
The two other possibleways -- forall buyers to communicate their
valuations, or for low valuation buyers alone to do so --arewasteful,
for they involve greater communication costs.Furthermore, it is
efficient that sellers obtain information enabling them todistinguish
between buyers' types if and only if the resulting social benefits--
performanceto buyers will range along a continuum, and wemay
always choose an upper region of this continuum sufficiently high that
the buyers whose valuations fall within itare a minority. See Section w.
4which inhere in sellers' taking different precautions for low andhigh
valuation buyers -- exceedthe communication costs incurred.
Second, if transfer of information about buyers' types is efficient,
then the limited liability rule of Had ley will result in efficient behavior.
Under the rule, high valuation buyers will find it beneficial toidentifr
themselves to secure full protection against breach even though they
will have to pay a higher contract price. And, informed of a buyer's
high valuation, sellers will take proper measures to increase the
likelihood of performance.
Third, if transfer of information about buyers' types is efficient,
then the unlimited liability rule will not produce efficient behavior.
Under the unlimited liability rule high valuation buyers will haveno
reason to identifr themselves (indeed, doing so would be costly, as it
would result in sellers' raising the contract price). Thus, the rulemay
lead to a situation in which sellers are unable to determine buyers'
types and consequently do not take added precautions for high
valuation buyers. Alternatively, the rule may lead low valuation
buyers to identify themselves in order to enjoy a reduction in the price.
In the latter case, sellers will have the informationnecessary to
distinguish between buyers' types, but the costs of transferring the
information will not be minimized.
Fourth, if transfer of information about buyers' types is not efficient
--becausecommunication costs are higher than the benefits from
differential precautions --thenneither the limited liability rule nor the
unlimited liability rule will necessarily lead to efficient behavior. The
reasons for this divergence from efficiency will be explained in the
course of the analysis.
Legal commentators have generally approved the limited liability
rule of Hadley v. Baxendale. Their endorsement is grounded for the
5most part in a perception that it is not fair for a person to be saddled
unnecessarily with an unforeseen burden, in the form of unusually high
liability for breach.9 In recent, economically-oriented writing on the
rule, the point has been stressed that high valuation buyers may be led
to communicate their valuations, and that this will lead sellers to take
greater precautions.'° The contribution of our article is the
development of a formal model in which optimal behavior of buyers and
sellers and their behavior under the two alternative liability rules are
fully characterized. This analysis allows us to determine the conditions
under which each of the rules induces, or fails to induce, optimal
behavior, and the conditions under which each of the rules is superior
to the other.11
Section II of the paper presents an informal analysis of the model,
and Section III supplies the formal analysis. Section IV discusses
various issues of relevance to our subject but not examined in the
model: the possibility that sellers may commit breach deliberately
(rather than fail to perform owing to inadequacy of precaution, as in
Hadley v. Baxendale); buyers' opportunities to mitigate losses from
9See, for example, Williston (1968:1357).
'°This observation was apparently first made by Barton (1972:295)
and Posner (1972:60; 1986:114). See also Bishop (1983:254), Danzig
(1975:277-284), Perloff (1981), Ayres and Gertner (1989:101-104,108-
112), and Johnston (1990).
"Our model was first developed in an earlier version ofour paper,
which was presented at the University of Pennsylvania Law School in
1983. Ayres and Gertner (1989:108-112) later independently sketched
a model of the subject. But, importantly, they did not identify efficient
behavior of buyers and sellers and thus did not contrast it with
behavior under the two alternative liability rules; and they did not
identify the conditions under which each of the rules is superior to the
other.
6breach; sellers' ignorance of the existence of high valuation buyers; risk
aversion; reasons for sellers to place absolute limitations on liability;
distributional considerations; the fact that the valuations of buyers will
generally lie on a continuum; the timing of communication between
buyer and seller (whether it occurs when a contract is made or
afterwards); and the difference between the role of unforeseeability in
contract law and in tort law.
Finally, Section V concludes with an assessment of the practical
importance of the rule of Hadley v. Baxendale. Our judgment will be
that the rule is not likely to be of much significance in situations in
which the contract is elaborate and dickered over, but may well be of
importance in a vast number of informal, routinized transactions.
II. INFORMAL ANALYSIS
A. Efficient Behavior
The measure of social welfare is taken to be the sum of buyers'
expected values'2 from contract performance, less sellers' costs of
precautions,'3 and less parties' costs of communication.
We first ascertain the efficient level of a seller's precautions,
conditional on his knowledge of a buyer's valuation. If a seller knows a
buyer's valuation, then the efficient level of precautions maximizes the
'2"Expected value" means probability-discounted value. If a seller
will obtain performance worth 100 to him with probability 50%, the
expected value of performance is 50. The expected value of
performance may be interpreted as the average value that buyers
would obtain if they repeatedly made contracts of the same type.
'3For simplicity, we speak only of costs of precautions, even though
sellers will bear other expenses in providing a service or producing a
good.
7expected value of performance minus the costs of precautions, where
the expected value of performance equals its probability multiplied by
its known value. Let us call this efficient level of precautions for low
valuation buyers the "low" level, and the efficient level of precautions
for high valuation buyers the "high" level.'4 If a seller does notknowa
buyer's valuation, the efficient level of precautions maximizes the
expected value of performance minus the costs of precautions, but
where the expected value of performance now equals its probability
multiplied by the seller's estimated average value of performance.'5
This latter efficient level of precautions falls between the low and high
levels, and thus will be called "intermediate."16
'4For example, suppose that there are three levels of precautions:
low, involving an expenditure of $20 and producing a 70% probability of
performance; intermediate, requiring an expenditure of $30 and leading
to an 80% probability of performance; and high, necessitating an
expenditure of $50 and yielding a 90% probability of performance.
Suppose also that the low valuation placed on performance is $50 and
that the high valuation is $500.
Then for low valuation buyers, low precautions are best: if
precautions are low, social welfare is 70%x$50 -$20=$15;if
precautions are intermediate, welfare is 80%x$50 -$30=$10;and if
precautions are high, welfare is 90%x$50 -$50=-$5;so low
precautions are efficient.
On the other hand, for high valuation buyers, high precautions are
best: if precautions are low, welfare is 70%x$500 -$20=$330;if
precautions are intermediate, welfare is 80%x$500 -$30=$370;and if
precautions are high, welfare is 90%x$500 -$50=$400.
'That is, the fraction of low valuation buyers multiplied by the low
valuation, plus the fraction of high valuation buyers multiplied by the
high valuation. Thus, if in our example 80% of buyers are low
valuation buyers, the average value would be 80%x50 +20%x500,or
140.
'61n our example if precautions are low, welfare per btiyer is
70%x$ 140 -$20=$78;if precautions are intermediate, welfare is
8We next determine the social value of communication of
information. In essence, this is the value of the provision of the two
individually efficient levels of precautions for the two types of buyers
rather than the intermediate level for both. Specifically, the social
value of communication of information is the difference between the
following two quantities: (i) the expected value of performance minus
costs of precautions if sellers know the identity of buyers, in which case
they take the low level of precautions for low valuation buyers and the
high level of precautions for high valuation buyers; and (ii) the
expected value of performance minus costs of precautions if sellers
receive no information, in which case they take the intermediate level
of precautions for both types of buyers.'7
We then observe that the minimum cost of communication of
information is the cost of the minority of buyers alone identifying
themselves. It is not necessary for both types of buyers to
80%x$ 140 -$30=$82;and if precautions are high, welfare is
90%x$140 -$50=$76;so the intermediate level of precaution is
efficient. (It may occur to the reader that, in our example, we had to
select numbers with some care, so that it would turn out that the
intermediate level of precautions would be efficient. However, the
reader should not be disturbed about this: for in the formal version of
our model the level of precautions is continuously variable, and the
efficient level of precautions is always intermediate, that is, somewhere
between the level that is best for low valuation buyers and the level
that is best for high valuation buyers.)
'71n our example, the value of communication of information is
calculated as follows. If there is communication, then social welfare
per buyer is 80%x$15 +20%x$400=$92,since $20 is the level of
precautions for low valuation buyers and $50 is the level of precautions
for high valuation buyers (see n. 14, supra). If there is no
communication, then welfare per buyer is $82, since $30 is the level of
precautions taken for all buyers (see ii.16,supra). Hence the social
value of communication is $92 -$82or $10 per buyer.
9communicate for sellers to possess complete information about buyers'
valuations. If only one type communicates, sellers will know that the
silent buyers must be of the second type. Moreover, it is best if the
type of buyer that is fewest in number communicates, namely, the high
valuation buyers, because that results in lower total communication
costs.18
Thus, efficient behavior can be simply described. It is efficient for
there to be communication, and solely by the high valuation buyers, if
and only if the social value of information exceeds the minimized cost of
communication.'9 When that is so, sellers should take the low level of
precautions for the low valuation buyers and the high level of
precautions for the high valuation buyers. If, however, communication
is not efficient, sellers should take the intermediate level of precautions
for all buyers.2°
B. Behavior Under the Two Rules of Contract Law
We suppose that the price charged to a buyer will equal a seller's
'8For instance, if $3 is the cost of communication for a buyer, then if
only the 20% of high valuation buyers communicate, the average
communication cost per buyer in the population would be 20%x$3 or
$.60.
'91n our example, if $3 is the cost of communicationper person, then
$.60 would be the minimized cost, when just the high valuation buyers
communicate, and $10 is the social value of communication. Therefore,
it is efficient for there to be communication by high valuation buyers.
201n our example, if communication costsper person were very high,
over $50, minimized communication costs per person, when just high
valuation buyers communicate, would exceed $10, sb that
communication would not be socially worthwhile.
10costs, for we assume that sellers are in competition with each other.2'
A seller's costs equal the sum of his costs of precautions, his expected
liability payments under the relevant rule of contract law, and his costs
of communication.
Limited liability rule. Under the limited liability rule, a low
valuation buyer will be compensated for his losses in the event of
breach, but a high valuation buyer will obtain only the low valuation in
that event unless he identified himself as having high valuation when
entering the contract.
What will happen under this rule? Clearly, low valuation buyers
will never choose to communicate, because they will obtain the same
amount in the event of breach whether or not they communicate. High
valuation buyers, on the other hand, may wish to communicate. If a
high valuation buyer does identify himself, he will receive more if there
is a breach but he will aiso be charged more. The latter is true not
only because the seller will have to pay more if he fails to perform, but
also because he will be induced to increase his level of precautions to
the high level, as well as to bear communication costs. If the
communication costs borne by the buyer and the seller are sufficiently
low, the high valuation buyer will decide to communicate; otherwise he
will not.
21This assumption is helpful because it makes the connection
between price and costs as simple as possible. Were we to analyze
different assumptions, such as that the market were monopolistic, price
would still reflect costs, but in a more complicated way. The
qualitative nature of our conclusions would not change, however.
In our numerical example, suppose that the buyer's cost of
communicating is $1 and that the seller's cost of communicating is $2.
The price charged to silent buyers would be $35, for $20 is the
expenditures on precautions, and 30%x$50 or $15 is the expected
11It follows that there are two possible equilibrium outcomes: a no-
communication equilibrium, and a communication equilibrium. In the
former, because sellers are liable only for the low value if there is a
breach, their level of precautions will be low. In the latter equilibrium,
sellers choose the low level of precautions for the buyers who do not
communicate (the low valuation buyers); and they choose the high level
of precautions for the buyers who do communicate (the high valuation
buyers).
The relationship between these types of outcomes and efficiency can
be shown to be as follows. If it is efficient for sellers to learn about
buyers' types, then the equilibrium under the limited liability rule
will be the communication equilibrium, and the efficient outcome will
result. In the communication equilibrium, only the high valuation
buyers communicate, which is efficient, and the levels of precautions
for high and low valuation buyers are high and low, respectively.
Exactly why the high valuation buyers will choose to communicate
whenever that is efficient is a somewhat subtle point that is best
appreciated from the formal analysis. It should be added that high
valuation buyers may choose to communicate even if it is notefficient,
which leads us to the next result.
liability for nonperformance. The price charged to a high valuation
buyer who identifies himself would be, by similar reasoning,
$50 +10%x$500+$2,or $102. Now if a high valuation buyer is silent,
and therefore receives only $50 in the event of nonperformance, he will
obtain expected utility of 70%x$500 +30%x$50-$35,or $300. If, on
the other hand, he identifies himself, he will obtain expected utility of
90%x$500 +10%x$500-$102 -$1or $397. Thus, a high valuation
buyer will choose to identifr himself, given the low costs of
communication assumed in our example.
This is the case in our numerical example.
12If it is not efficient for sellers to learn about buyers' types, then the
equilibrium under the limited liability rule may be a communication
equilibrium or a no-communication equilibrium. If the equilibrium
involves communication, it obviously is not efficient. And even if the
equilibrium is a no-communication equilibrium, it will not be efficient:
as we explained, in a no-communication equilibrium, sellers will choose
the low level of precautions, because their liability for breach will be
low. Yet the efficient level of precautions if there is no communication
is the intermediate level. Thus, the level of precautions under the
limited liability rule will be too low.
Unlimited liability rule. Under the unlimited liability rule, both
types of buyers will be compensated for their losses in the event of
breach, whether or not they communicate. The situation under this
rule is in many respects the mirror image of that under the limited
liability rule.
It is evident that under the unlimited liability rule, high valuation
buyers will never communicate. They will obtain the same amount in
the event of breach whether or not they communicate, and
communicating their valuation not only involves communication costs
but also could result in sellers charging a higher price.
Low valuation buyers, though, may decide to identify themselves. If
a low valuation buyer makes a representation about his low valuation,
the seller will know that his liability costs will be lower and, because of
this, will choose a lower level of precautions and charge a lower price.
A low valuation buyer will communicate if this price reduction would
outweigh the communication costs he would bear.24
241n our numerical example, suppose that if low valuation buyers
communicate and identify themselves, they are charged the costs
sellers bear, $20 +30%x$50+$2,or $37. Suppose that if they do not
13Again, therefore, both a no-communication equilibrium and a
communication equilibrium are possible. In the no-communication
equilibrium, because sellers are liable for whatever the buyer's
valuation turns out to be, sellers will decide to take the intermediate
level of precautions. In the communication equilibrium, sellers will
choose the low level of precautions for the low valuation buyers (who
will identify themselves) and the high level of precautions for the other
buyers whom sellers will know have high valuations.
The relationship between the equilibrium outcomes and efficiency is
as follows. First, if communication is efficient, then the equilibrium
may either be a no-communication or a communication equilibrium, but
in neither case will the outcome be efficient. If there is no
communication, plainly the outcome is not efficient. If there is
communication, then the outcome is not efficient because the majority
of buyers communicate; the costs of communication are therefore higher
than necessary. (The levels of precautions, however, are efficient.)
Second, if communication is not efficient, then again both a
communication equilibrium and a no-communication equilibrium are
possible. If the equilibrium involves communication, it cannot be
efficient. If the equilibrium is a no-communication equilibrium, it is
efficient. In particular, sellers' levels of precaution will be
intermediate, as was mentioned, which is efficient when there is no
identify themselves, they are charged a higher price than $38. Then
they will identify themselves.
Specifical1y, in our numerical example, suppose that silent buyers
are charged what must be charged if they are high valuation buyers,
namely, $50 +10%x$500,or $100. And suppose that low valuation
buyers who identify themselves are charged $37. Then, as observed in
the previous note, low valuation buyers will identify themselves, and
high valuation buyers will be the silent buyers.
14communication.
Comparison of the rules. If communication is efficient, the limited
liability rule is socially superior to the unlimited liability rule. In this
case, as we stated, the equilibrium under the limited liability rule will
definitely be the efficient one: a communication equilibrium will occur,
with high valuation buyers identifring themselves. By contrast, under
the unlimited liability rule, the outcome will not be efficient. Even if
there is a communication equilibrium, communication will be more
expensive than necessary, because the majority of buyers (those with a
low valuation) will communicate rather than the minority of buyers
(those with a high valuation).
If communication is not efficient, then either the limited liability
rule or the unlimited liability rule may be superior. Specifically, the
unlimited liability rule is preferable if it would produce a no-
communication equilibrium. (This no-communication equilibrium
would lead to efficient behavior because sellers will use the
intermediate level of precautions.) But the unlimited liability rule
would be inferior if it would produce a communication equilibrium in
which low valuation buyers identiiy themselves. (Because of the
excessive transaction costs produced by the unlimited liability rule, it
will turn out to be inferior to the limited liability rule even though the
latter does not induce efficient behavior.)
In our numerical example, there was, as was efficient,
communication in equilibrium under both rules. The communication
cost per person under the limited liability rule was $.60. The
communication cost under the unlimited liability rule was 80%x$3 or




Risk neutral buyers make contracts with identical risk neutral
sellers for the production of a good or the provision of a service. The
buyers are of two types, distinguished by whether they place a low or a
high valuation on performance of the contract. Specifically, let
1 =valueof performance to low valuation buyers; 1 >0;
h =valueof performance to high valuation buyers; h >1;
a =fractionof high valuation buyers; 0 <a<.5.
Buyers know their own valuations. Sellers know that there is a
fraction a of buyers with valuation h and a fraction 1 -awith
valuation 1, but a seller cannot observe a buyer's valuation when
entering into a contract.
When a contract is made, a buyer may make either the statement "I
am an 1" or "I am an h." Adding the making of such statements to the
contracting process involves costs for both the buyer and the seller.
These costs, which we shall call conirijuni cation costs, are the same
whether the buyer says that his valuation is high or low. Let
=costto a seller of communication; k, >0;
=costto a buyer of communication; kb >0.
Also, define
Although our concern is with the case where a <.5,we note that
Propositions 2 and 4 do not depend on a, and that the other
Propositions change in straightforward ways if a ? .5. For example,
when a> .5, if communication is efficient, it is best for the low
valuation buyers to identify themselves. Thus, in that instance, the
limited liability rule never results in the efficient outcome, but the
unlimited liability rule may. A previous version of our paper, available
on request, analyzes fully the case when a .5.
16k =k1+kb?
Sellerscan enhance the probability of performance by increasing
their expenditures on precautions. (Hereinafter "precautions" should
be understood to mean expenditures on precautions.) Let
x =aseller's precautions; and
p(x) =probabilityof contract performance; 1 >p()>0; p'(x) >0;
p"(x) <0.
Also, let x1 and X,1denotesellers' levels of precautions for low valuation
and high valuation buyers, respectively, for they may differ.
Assumptions about pricing and sellers' strategy will be discussed in a
subsequent section.
Social welfare is taken to be the expected value buyers derive from
performance, less sellers' expenditures on precautions, and less parties'
communication costs. Thus, supposing without loss of generality that
the population of buyers is normalized to 1, social welfare is given by
[(1 -a)p(x,)l+ap(xh)h] - [(1-a)x1+ax,1]minus the costs of
communication, which will be described later.
Our analysis will proceed as follows. In subsection B, we examine
the social welfare-maximizing behavior of buyers and sellers; in
subsection C, we discuss sellers' pricing; in subsection D, we examine
behavior under the limited liability rule for breach of contract; in
subsection E, we examine behavior under the unlimited liability rule;
We assume for simplicity and without loss of generality that, when
the contracting just involves specifying the promised performance and
the price but no representation about the buyer's valuation, no
transaction costs are incurred. Assuming that specifying the promised
performance and the price does involve certain transaction costswould
not change any of our results.
17and in subsection F, we compare the limited and the unlimited liability
rules.
B. Efficient Behavior
To identify the efficient behavior of buyers and sellers, it is
necessary to answer two questions: (i) When should buyers
communicate with sellers? (ii) Given sellers' information, what should
their levels of precautions be?
We will begin with question (ii) because it must be answered in
order to address question Ci). Sellers will either have information
allowing them to distinguish between the two types of buyers --this
will be so if buyers communicate, as will be discussed --orthey will
not. If sellers are able to distinguish between buyers, then sellers can
select x1 and Xhindependently.Thus, the choice of these variables that
maximizes social welfare is given by
(1)max(1 -a)[p (x1)l -x11+a(p(xh)h-xh],
X1, Xh







Denotethe solutions to (2) and (3) by x, and Xh,respectively,
and observe that




Ifsellers are unable to distinguish between the two typesof buyers,
sellers must choose a common level of precautions,to be called x; the
best such level is determined by
(6)max p(x)Rl -c.)l+ cth] -x.
Denotethe solution to (6) by x, and notice that3°
(7)X<Xjj <Xh.
Theexplanation for the inequality is, of course,that the level of
precautions should reflect the presenceof both types of buyers.
Turning now to question (i), we will computethe social value of
sellers having information about buyers' valuationsand the social cost
of their obtaining this information throughcommunication. The social
value of sellers having information is the increasein social welfare
(exclusive of communication costs) when sellerschoose different effort
levels x and Xhforthe two types of buyers, rather than the
intermediate, common level xm'. Denoting thesocial value of
information by I, we have
p(x)u -xis increasing in v. To see this, note that this xsatisfies
p'(x)v =1.Implicitly differentiating with respect to v, weobtain
x'(v) =-p'(x)/p"(x)u> 0. Inequality (5) follows becausethe derivative of
p(x(v))v -x(u)with respect to v isp(x(v)) > 0.
30lnequality (7) follows from 1 <(1 -a)l+ ah < h and from the fact
that x(v) is increasing in v; see the previous note.
19(8) I =(1-a)fp(x1)l-x,]+a[p(x1)h-Xhl
- {(p(x)[(1 - a)l+a/i] - xM'}
= (1 - a){1p(x,)l-x']-[p(x,')l - x']}
+ a{[p(x)h - xi']-[p(x,,)h-XM']}> 0.
Notethat the second expression for I showsthatthe value of
information derives from an improvement in the choiceofprecautions
for each of the two types of buyers. Specifically, each of the terms in
braces in the second expression is positive, because x(rather
than x')solves(2) and Xh(ratherthan x,) solves (3).
Three regimes of communication will enable sellers to distinguish
between buyers: where both types of buyers communicate; where only
low valuation buyers communicate --inwhich case silent buyers are
known to be high valuation buyers; or where only high valuation
buyers communicate --inwhich case silent buyers are known to be low
valuation buyers. The least cost regime is that in which only high
valuation buyers communicate, because they are in the minority. Thus,
the minimum social cost of providing sellers with information enabling
them to distinguish the two types of buyers is ak.
Hence, it is efficient for there to be communication if and only if
(9)ak<I.
Dividing by a and using (8), condition (9) is equivalent to
(10)k < {lp(xh)h - Xh] - [p(x)h-
+ [(1-a)/a}{(p(x1)l-x,} - [p(x,,')l-x]}.
Theinterpretation of (10) is that a representative high valuation buyer
should communicate if the cost k of communication to him and the
seller is less than the gain in "surplus" to him (the first term in braces)
20plus the gain in surplus per low valuation buyer (the second term in
braces), multiplied by the number of low valuation buyers ((1 -a)/a)
who so benefit from his communication (remember that when high
valuation buyers communicate, low valuation buyers are implicitly
identified as well).
Let us now summarize our conclusions concerning the efficient
behavior of buyers and sellers.
Proposition 1. (a) If the minimum social cost of provision of
information about buyers' types is less than its value --if(10) is
satisfied --thenit is efficient for only the high valuation buyers, who
are in the minority, to identifSr themselves; and for sellers to select the
high level of precautions Xhforhigh valuation buyers and the low level
of precautions x1 for low valuation buyers.
(b) If, however, the inequality in (10) is reversed, then it is not
efficient for buyers of either type to identifSr themselves. In this case it
is efficient for sellers to choose the intermediate level of precautions x
for all buyers.3'
Remarks: A number of observations can be made about the effects of
changes in parameters on whether communication is efficient.
(i) The size of communication costs k. It is clear from (10) that,
given the variables other than k, communication is efficient for all k
below the threshold I/a and that communication is inefficient for all k
above this threshold.
3t0f course, if(10) holds with equality, it does not matter whether
there is no communication or communication by low valuation buyers.
We omit mention of the case of equality in (10) and elsewhere below in
order to simplifS' the statement of propositions.
21(ii) The fraction of buyers in the minority. If communication is
efficient for some a', it is efficient also for all a <a'.32Moreover, an
a' such that communication is efficient exists if and only if the
following inequality holds.
(11)k <[p(xh)h-Xh] - p(x)h-x}.
(iii) Buyers' valuations h and 1. It is straightforward to show that
an increase in h or a decrease in 1 raises the social value of
information, I, and thus makes the efficiency of communication more
likely.
Write I =1(a)to show the dependence of I on a and assume that
1(a) is concave in a, so that 1(cc) -akis also concave in a. Then if
communication is efficient for some a', 1(a') -a'k>0. But
1(0) -Oh=1(0)=0.Since, then, the function 1(a) -o.kis 0 at a =0,
positive at a', and is assumed to be concave, it must be positive in the
interval (0,a'].
Thus, it suffices to demonstrate that 1(a) is indeed concave. To do
this, we will show that I"(a) <0.Consider the first expression for I in
(8). The first two terms are linear in a, so their second derivative with
respect to a is 0. Hence, we need only determine the second derivative
of the last term, -{(p(x)[(1 -a)l+ah]-x},with respect to a. The
first derivative of this term is {x,*'(a){p'(x)[(1 -a)l+oh]-1}+
(h-l)p(xth)};but making use of the first-order condition from (6), this
equals just -(h -l)p(x).The derivative of this with respect to a is
-(h -l)p'(x')x"(a),which is negative because the first-order condition
for (6) implies that xth'(a) is positive.
To prove this, refer to the second expression in (8) for I and
observe that I'(a) =-{[p(x)l-x,]-[p(x,,)l-xjh]}+{[p(x,)h-XhI -
[p(x)h-x]}-x'(a){p'(x')[(1 -a)l+a/i]-1}.Using this expression,
the fact that x =x,at a =0,and the first-order condition
p'(x1)l -1=0,we obtain I'(O) =[p(xh')h-XhIJ-[.p(x,)h-
Hence,(11) is equivalent to k <I'(O). But since cth and I are both 0
at a =0,k <I'(O) implies that o.k <1(a) for all positive a sufficiently
small, so communication is efficient for such a. Conversely, if (11) does
not hold, then k >I'(O),meaning that cth >1(a)for all positive a since
1(a) is strictly concave (see the previous footnote), so that
communication is inefficient for all positive a.
22C. Contracts and Prices
A contract between a seller and a buyer is assumed to specify the
promised performance (the features of the promised good or service)
and the price, to be paid by the buyer at the outset.
In addition, as already noted, when a contract is made, a buyer may
make a statement about his type: "I am an 1" or "I am an h"; in such a
case, the statement will be part of the contract.The implications of
these statements (or lack thereof) for sellers' liability in the event of
breach will be described when the two alternative liability rules are
defined. We do not assume that buyers' statements about their type
must be true. Rather we will show that, under the two considered
rules, buyers will never choose to make false statements.
In the event of a seller's nonperformance (the terms
"nonperformance" and "breach" will be used synonymously), we assume
that a buyer can demonstrate the value of his loss to the court.
Whether the seller will be liable for the full loss from breach, however,
will depend on the liability rule that governs and the buyer's
statement, if any.
Under the limited liability rule, a seller's liability is 1 unless the
buyer has high valuation and states that he is an h when entering into
the contract, in which case the seller's liability for breach will be h. In
essence, a high valuation buyer's decision to identifyhimself as having
a high valuation is a decision to opt out of a contract with a ceilingof 1
on damages in favor of full liability.
Under the unlimited liability rule, a seller's liability to a low
valuation buyer is 1 and his liability to a high valuation buyer is h if
the buyer does not identify himself; but if the buyer says that he is an
1, the seller's liability will be 1 (and if the buyer says that heis an
the seller's liability will be h). Thus, a buyer who identifies himself as
23having low valuation opts out of unlimited liability in favor of a ceiling
of 1 on damages.
The sequence of decisions by the parties is as follows. Sellers
choose strategies: a seller announces the price that he will charge as a
function of the statement, if any, that a buyer makes. Buyers then
approach sellers and, given the sellers' strategies, decide whether to
make statements.
The market is assumed to be in a state of (Nash) equilibrium and to
be perfectly competitive. Thus, sellers make expected profits of zero.
Before proceeding, observe that because sellers maximize profits,
they minimize their expected costs. Hence, if a seller knows that his
liability in the event of nonperforniance will be 1, he will choose his
level of precautions x to solve
(12)mm x +[1-p(x)]I.
x
It is clear that the solution to this problem is the same as the solution
to (2), so the seller will choose x. Similarly, if a seller knows that his
liability for breach will be h, he will choose xh; and if a seller's liability
for breach will be 1 with probability 1 -aand h with probability a, he
will choose x. Let us denote by c1,ch, andctherespective sums of
the seller's costs of precautions and expected liability payments in the
three situations just described:
(13.1)c,= x' + [1-p(x,)]l;
(13.2) Ch= Xh + [1p()]1
(13.3) c =+ [1-p(x)][(1-a)l+ah].
D. Behavior Under the Limited Liability Rule
The following two propositions describe behavior under the limited
liability rule and compare this behavior to efficient behavior.
24Proposition 2. Under the limited liability rule, there are two possible
types of equilibrium outcomes, and which one obtains depends on
whether the following inequality is satisfied.
(14)k <(h-ch)-{p(x1)h+ (1 -p(x1))l -c1}
=[P(xh)h-xh] - (p(x1')h-x]
(a) If (14) holds, there is a unique equilibrium in which high
valuation buyers alone identify themselves and sellers select the high
level of precaution x, for these buyers, charging them C,+ k.Sellers
choose the low level of precautions x for the silent buyers, who are low
valuation buyers, charging them c1.
(b) If the inequality in (14) is reversed, there is a unique
equilibrium in which no buyers identify themselves, and sellers choose
the low level of precautions x' for all buyers, charging them c1.
Remarks: The proof of Proposition 2 rests on two points. First, if a low
valuation buyer identifies himself, he will not thereby alter the seller's
liability for breach, but he would have to bear communication costs
(and the seller would increase price to reflect the communication costs
the seller bears). Hence, low valuation buyers will not identify
themselves.
Second, a high valuation buyer may be able to improve his position
by identifying himself. If he does communicate, he will bear the
communication cost kb, will pay a price of Ch+k, and will obtain
performance or its equivalent, a liability payment of h; thus his
expectedutilitywillbehkb(ch+k.)h-Ch-k. Ifhedoesnot
communicate, he will pay a price of C1and,if he does not obtain
performance, will receive a liability payment of only 1. Hence, his
expected utility will bep(x1)h + (1-p(x1))l -c1.Thus, he will decide to
25communicate if the first inequality in (14) holds, and substitution
establishes the equality in (14). Conversely, if the inequality in (14) is
reversed, a high valuation buyer will decide to be silent.
Note that the second expression in (14) is the increase in the
surplus that high valuation buyers enjoy if precautions change from the
low level X14Ctothe high level Xh*.Thehigh valuation buyers capture
the entire surplus if they identify themselves, because sellers' profits
are assumed to be zero.
Proof.Theproof is carried out in several steps.
(i) There cannot be an equilibrium in which any buyers identify
themselves as l's: Suppose otherwise. Then the price charged to such
buyers must be c1 +k,, forin equilibrium price must equal cost. If in
the equilibrium there are also transactions with silent buyers, the price
charged to them must be c1. But the buyers who state that they are i's
would then be better off being silent and paying c1 than c, +k.. Onthe
other hand, if in the equilibrium there are no transactions with silent
buyers, a seller could offer a price between c, and c1 +k, tosilent
buyers. This would attract buyers who say they are i's and would
allow positive profits for the seller.
(ii) If (14) holds, then there is an equilibrium in which h's alone
identify themselves as h's, as described in part (a): Suppose that there
are two types of contract offered, a contract for silent buyers at price c1,
and a contract for buyers who identify themselves as h's at price
Ch+ k,.First, observe that sellers will choose Xi*cforsilent buyers
because their liability will be 1, and sellers will choose x for buyers
who identify themselves as h's because their liability will be h; also,
sellers' profits will be zero for each type of contract. Second, buyers
will do as claimed. i's will be silent; for if they say they are h's and pay
26the higher price, their expected utility will be (1 -p(xh*))h + p(x*)l - c-
whichis less than (1 p(xh*))h +p(Xh*)l-c,=p(xh*)l-Xh* <p(x*)l-=
1-c1,which is their expected utility if they are silent. Also, h's will
identify themselves as h's, by the logic supplied in the Remarks. Third,
sellers cannot make positive profits by offering an alternative contract.
A seller could not make positive profits by offering a different contract
to silent buyers or to buyers who identify themselves as h's. If a seller
offered a contract to buyers who identified themselves as i's, he would
have to charge at least c1 +k,to make a positive profit, but buyers
would prefer to be silent and pay c1.
(iii) If (14) holds, the equilibrium in which h's alone identify
themselves is the only equilibrium: First, there cannot be an
equilibrium in which any buyers identify themselves as i's, by (i).
Next, suppose that there is an equilibrium in which high valuation
buyers remain silent and are charged c1. But then a seller offering a
price slightly above c +k.to those stating that they are h's will attract
these high valuation buyers, by (14), and make a profit. Finally,
suppose that there is an equilibrium in which lowvaluation buyers
state that they are h's. In such an equilibrium, these buyers must be
charged at least c, +k,,but in the event of breach, given that the actual
loss they can demonstrate to the court is 1, they will still obtain only 1.
Therefore, a seller who offers a price slightly above c1 to silent buyers
will be able to attract these low valuation buyers and make a profit.
(iv) If the inequality in (14) is reversed, then there is an equilibrium
in which no one identifies himself, as described in part (b): Suppose
that there is only one contract offered, in which c1 is the price for silent
buyers, and that buyers would purchase this contract. In this case,
sellers would choose x and make zero profits. A seller could not make
positive profits by offering a contract to buyers who identify themselves
27as i's, because he would have to charge them more than c1 +k,,which
would not attract them. A seller could not make positive profits by
offering a contract to h's who identiiy themselves as h's because the
inequality in (14) is reversed, as explained in the Remarks. And it is
easily seen that a seller could not make positive profits by offering a
contract to i's who identlir themselves as h's.
(v) If the inequality in (14) is reversed, there are no equilibria other
than the one just described: There cannot be an equilibrium in which
any buyers identify themselves as l's, by (i).And proceeding in a way
analogous to step (iii), it can be shown that there cannot be an
equilibrium in which h's identi! themselves as h's, because the
inequality in (14) is reversed; and that there cannot be an equilibrium
in which l's say that they are h's.
Proposition 3. (a) If it is efficient for there to be communication
between (high valuation) buyers and sellers, then the outcome under
the limited liability rule will be efficient.
(b) Otherwise, the outcome will not be efficient.
Remarks: With regard to part (a), observe that if communication is
efficient and (14) holds, then by Proposition 2(a) and Proposition 1(a),
the outcome will be efficient: high valuation buyers alone will
communicate, and precautions for the low and high valuation buyers
will be x and Xh*,respectively.Thus, what needs to be established is
that if it is efficient for high valuation buyers to communicate, then
(14) will hold.
This turns out to be the case; indeed, high valuation buyers
communicate not only when that is efficient but also in some cases
when that is inefficient. To understand why, compare the right-hand
28side of (10) to the second expression in (14). If the formeris less than
the latter, then communication by high valuation buyerswill occur
whenever it is efficient. Now the right-hand side of (10)is the gain in
surplus to a high valuation buyer plus the gainto (1 -a)Ia low
valuation buyers, when precautions change from x to efficientlevels
X,4andXh*.Thesecond expression in (14) is the gain in surplus to high
valuation buyers plus the gain --whichhappens to be zero --to(1 -
a)/ctlow valuation buyers, when precautions change from x toefficient
levels x1* and x,. This latter gain in surplus is larger becauseit
involves a change to efficient levels of precautions from thelevel x1,
which is inefficient when there is no communication, ratherthan from
the level x, which is efficient when there is no communication.
Part (b) is clearly true if high valuation buyers communicatewhen
that is not efficient. Suppose on the other hand that no buyers
communicate, the only other type of equilibrium, by Proposition2. This
equilibrium is not efficient if it is efficient that no buyerscommunicate,
because sellers choose low precautions of x, rather thanintermediate
precautions x. In essence, the problem isthat their liability is only 1,
whereasthe true social cost of breach is (1 -a)l+ah,which is
higher.TM
Proof. The proof is clear from the Remarks, exceptthat we need to
show that if it is efficient for h's to communicate, then (14)holds. Now
multiplying (14) by a, we obtain
TMIf liability for breach were equal to (1 -a)l+a/irather than 1 in
the absence of communication, then sellers would choose x. However,
it can be shown that high valuation buyers under thisrule would not
necessarily communicate whenever communicationwould be efficient;
the explanation is that they would not obtain the fullsocial surplus
from communicating.
29(15) ak <c4P(xh)h-xh} - a(p(x,')h-x,].
It suffices to show that the right hand side of (15)exceeds i, for then (9)
will imply (15). Subtracting I from the right-hand side of (15), we
obtain
(16) {p(x*)[(l -a)l+ ahl -x*}-{p(xj*)[(1-a)l+ ah] -x,*}.
But (16) must be positive, because x maximizes p(x)[(l -a)l+cth]-x
over all possible x.
E. Behavior Under the Unlimited Liability Rule
The next two propositions describe behavior under the unlimited
liability rule and compare it to efficient behavior.
Proposition 4. Under the unlimited liability rule, there are two possible
types of equilibrium outcomes, and which one obtainswill depend on
whether the following inequality is satisfied.
(17)k<cM-cI
(a) If (17) holds, there is a unique equilibrium in which low
valuation buyers alone identify themselves and sellers select the low
level of precautions x for these buyers, charging them c, +k,Sellers
choose the high level of precautions xA1' for the silent buyers, who are
high valuation buyers, and charge them Ch.
(b)If the inequality in (17) is reversed, there is a unique
equilibrium in which no buyers identify themselves, and sellers choose
the intermediate level of precautions x,, for all buyers, and charge
them c,,1.
Reniarks: To explain these results, observe first that if a high
30valuation buyer identifies himself, he will not increase the seller's
liability for breach --itwill be h whether or not he identifies himself --
buthe would face a price increase and would bear his communication
costs. Consequently, high valuation buyers will not identify
themselves.
Second, note that a low valuation buyer may want to identify
himself. If he does so, he will bear the communication cost kb and will
be charged c1 +k,,whereas if he is silent he would be charged cm if the
seller attracted both low and high valuation buyers. In either case, he
will obtain performance or its equivalent in a liability payment. Hence,
an equilibrium in which low valuation buyers identify themselves will
exist if and only if kb +C1 ÷k8 <Clh,whichis the same condition as (17).
Proof. (i) There cannot be an equilibrium in which any buyers identify
themselves as h's: If not, there are several possibilities for equilibria in
which some buyers say they are h's. First, suppose that there is an
equilibrium in which all buyers say that they are h's, so that the price
would be Ca+ k1.But this situation can be upset, for a seller could
make positive profits by offering a contract to silent buyers at a slightly
lower price: this definitely would attract h's and allow a profit (if it
attracted i's as well, that would only increase profits). Second, suppose
that there is an equilibrium in which h's say that they are h's and i's
are silent. Then the price for h's must be C,+ kand for the silent, c1.
But this cannot be, for the h's would then prefer to be silent. Third,
suppose that there is an equilibrium in which h's say that they are h's
and i's say that they are i's. This, however, can be upset by a seller
who offers to the silent a contract at a price slightly below ch +k,:this
would attract h's and allow a profit. Fourth, suppose that there is an
equilibrium in which l's say that they are h's and h's are silent. Then
31the l'swould pay C,+ k,and the silent would pay Ch.Butthis can be
upset by a seller who offers a contract at a price slightly above c2+ k,to
buyers who say that they are i's: this would attract i's and allow a
profit. Finally, suppose that there is an equilibrium in which i's say
that they are h's and h's say that they are i's. Thus, i's would pay
ch +k1and h's would pay c +k,.But this cannot be, for then h's would
prefer to say they are h's and i's to say they are l's.
(ii) If (17) holds, then there is an equilibrium in which l's alone
identify themselves, as described in part (a): Suppose that there are
two types of contract offered, a contract for silent buyers at price Ch,
anda contract at price c, +k,for buyers who say they are l's. Then
buyers will do as claimed. h's will clearly choose to be silent. l's will
identify themselves as l's: if they do, they pay c1 +k,and bear kb,fora
total cost of c1 +k,which is less than cm, by (17), and thus less than ch;
hence they will not remain silent. Sellers will choose x, for silent
buyers because their liability will be h, and sellers will choose x1* for l's
who identify themselves because their liability will be 1. Sellers' profits
will be zero for each type of contract.
It remains to show that sellers cannot make positive profits by
offering an alternative contract. A seller clearly could not make
positive profits by offering a different contract to buyers who identify
themselves as l's. If a seller makes positive profits by offering a
different contract to silent buyers, he must attract l's. To do this, the
price must be less than c1 +k,but then he will attract h's as well. This
means that the price must exceed cm, yet (17) then implies that l's
would not be attracted. Finally, a seller cannot make positive profits
by offering a contract to buyers who identify themselves as h's, because
he would have to charge them more thanch +k.
(iii) If (17) holds, the equilibrium just described in which l's alone
32identify themselves is the only equilibrium: There cannot be an
equilibrium in which any buyers identify themselves as h's, by (i).
Another possible equilibrium is one in which all buyers say that they
are i's, and therefore pay c1 +k,.This can be upset by a contract for
the silent at a price slightly above c: it would attract h's and allow
profits. An additional possibility is an equilibrium in which h's say
that they are i's and thus pay c1 +k,,and in which i's are silent and
therefore pay c1. But this cannot be, for h's would prefer to be silent. A
final possibility is an equilibrium in which no buyers identify
themselves. If this is an equilibrium, the price must be c. But this
cannot be an equilibrium because a seller could offer a contract to l's
who identify themselves at a price slightly higher than c1 +k.This
would attract l's, by (17), and allow the seller a profit.
(iv) If the inequality in (17) is reversed, then there is an equilibrium
in which no buyers identify themselves, as described in part (b):
Suppose that there is only one contract offered, in which c is the price
for silent buyers. Both types of buyers would purchase this contract.
Also, sellers would choose x and make zero profits. A seller could not
make positive profits by offering a contract to buyers who identify
themselves as l's, because he would have to charge them more than
c1 +k,,which would not attract them, because the inequality in (17) is
reversed. A seller obviously could not make positive profits by offering
a contract to buyers who identify themselves as h's.
(v) If the inequality in (17) is reversed, there are no equilibria other
than the one just described: There cannot be an equilibrium in which
any buyers identify themselves as h's by (i). There cannot be an
equilibrium in which all buyers say that they are i's as noted in step
(ill). It was also stated there that there cannot be an equilibrium in
which h's say that they are l's and l's are silent. Finally, there cannot
33be an equilibrium in which l's say that they are i's and are charged
c ÷ k,,andh's are silent and are charged ch. For a seller could make
positive profits by offering a contract to silent buyers at a price slightly
above cm. This would attract i's, because the inequality in (17) is
reversed, and although it would also attract h's, it would allow the
seller profits.
Proposition 5. (a) If communication between (high valuation) buyers
and sellers is efficient, then the outcome under the unlimited liability
rule will not be efficient.
(b) If communication between (high valuation) buyers and sellers is
not efficient, then the outcome under the unlimited liability rule will be
efficient if there is no communication but the outcome will be inefficient
if there is communication.
Remarks: Part (a) is clear. By Proposition 4,highvaluation buyers
never communicate, so that the outcome cannot be efficient.
With regard to part (b), observe that if low valuation buyers do not
communicate, the outcome will be efficient because, as stated in
Proposition 4(b), sellers will choose the level of precautions x. On the
other hand, if low valuation buyers do communicate, the outcome
cannot be efficient.
It should be pointed out why there may be communication even
though it is not efficient. The value to a low valuation buyer of
identifying himself is the price reduction C- c,the right-hand side of
(17). This price reduction comes about in part because the low
valuation buyer does not have to implicitly subsidize high valuation
buyers. The gain to a low valuation buyer from not subsidizing high
valuation buyers can be high," even when social gains from
34communication of information are "low" (because it is expensive to alter
levels of precautions or doing that is ineffective), that is, even when the
right-hand sides of (9) and (10) are small.
Proof.Theproof is clear from the Remarks.
F. Comparison of the Rules
The next proposition states the circumstances under which one or
the other rule is superior from the perspective of efficiency.
Proposition 6. (a) If it is efficient for there to be communication
between (high valuation) buyers and sellers, then the limited liability
rule is superior to the unlimited liability rule.
(b) If it is not efficient for there to be communication between
buyers and sellers, then the unlimited liability rule is superior to the
limited liability rule if there is no communication under the unlimited
liability rule, but the limited liability rule is superior otherwise.
Renjarks: That part (a) is true is readily seen. If communication is
efficient, we know from Proposition 3(a) that it will occur under the
limited liability rule and that the outcome will be efficient. On the
other hand, we know from Proposition 5(a), that the outcome will not
be efficient under the unlimited liability rule; even if there is
communication, it will not be by the minority of buyers, those with the
high valuation.
With regard to Part (b), observe first that, by Proposition 5(b), if
communication is not efficient and it does not occur under the
unlimited liability rule, the outcome will be efficient. However, by
Proposition 3(b), the outcome will not be efficient under the limited
35liability rule; even if there is no communication, the level of
precautions will be incorrect, x, rather than x.
It remains to consider the case where communication is not efficient
but it does occur under the unlimited liability rule. In this situation,
according to Part (b), the limited liability rule is superior. Suppose
first that there is also communication under the limited liability rule.
Then this rule is superior, for under it only the high valuation buyers
communicate, whereas under the unlimited liability rule the low
valuation buyers communicate. Now suppose that there is no
communication under the limited liability rule. It must then be that
social welfare is higher under the rule when there is no communication
than if there were communication, for high valuation buyers would
capture the surplus from communication yet choose not to. The
conclusion now follows because social welfare would be higher if there
were communication under the limited liability rule than under the
unlimited liability rule, because under the former only the high
valuation buyers communicate.
Proof. The only relationship requiring proof is that between the two
rules when it is inefficient for there to be communication but i's
identify themselves under the unlimited liability rule. We consider the
two subeases.
(i) Suppose that under the limited liability rule, the equilibrium is
such that the h's identify themselves. Then social welfare is higher
under the limited liability rule: Under both rules, sellers choose x for
the i's and Xh*forthe h's, but communication costs are lower under the
limited liability rule, because h's are in the minority and only they
communicate. Hence, social welfare is higher under the limited
liability rule.
36(ii) Suppose that under the limited liability rule, the equilibrium is
such that no buyers identif' themselves. Then social welfare is higher
under the limited liability rule: Under both rules, x is the level of
precautions for l's. Consequently, the difference between the outcomes
under the rules is that, under the limited liability rule, x1 is the level
of precautions for h's, whereas under the unlimited liability rule, Xh*is
the level of precautions for h's, but (1 -a)kis incurred in
communication costs. Hence, to show that social welfare is higher
under the limited liability rule, we need to demonstrate that
(21) (1 -a)k>a[(p(xh*)h-xh*)-(j*)h-
Becausethere is no communication under the limited liability rule, the
inequality in (14) must be reversed. Multiplying both sides of (14) by a
and reversing the inequality, we obtain




In our model nonperformance came about because of buyers' failure
to take greater precautions to raise the likelihood of performance,
rather than because of outright decisions not to perform. Our
assumption was probably appropriate in regard to the situation in
Hadley v. Baxendale. We may imagine, for instance, that the
precaution of attaching a special label on Hadley's engine shaft was not
undertaken when it was shipped from its point of departure; and that
37this made it more likely, but not certain, that at some later point of
transfer, the shaft would be left behind --ashappened in London (see
note 3, supra). In many instances, however, breach is a deliberate,
willful act in the sense that it is known that the act definitely will
result in nonperformance. This would have been so in Hadley v.
Baxendale if Pickford's agents in London decided to delay shipment of
the shaft to Greenwich in order to ship something else instead. Indeed,
most of the economic literature on breach of contract has focused on
such deliberate, willful decisions.
Our analysis and conclusions would be little altered were we to
examine a model in which breach is deliberate. In a model of this type,
it would be efficient for performance to occur when and only when its
value exceeds the cost of performance. And the seller would decide to
perform in exactly these efficient circumstances if he knows the value
of performance and would have to pay this in damages if he committed
breach. Thus, as in our model, it would be efficient for the seller to
obtain information about the value of performance if the cost of
communication is low enough. Further, under the limited liability rule,
a buyer would tend to want to inform the seller of his valuation despite
his having to pay a higher price, and so forth.
B. Buyers' Precautions and Mitigation of Losses
We made the simplifring assumption that buyers could not affect
the losses they suffer from breach. But buyers sometimes can act to
reduce their losses, either by taking preparatory steps (Hadley might
have kept a spare, if imperfect, shaft on hand for emergency use) or by
doing something after a breach (Hadley might have borrowed an engine
shaft upon learning that delivery of a new one would be delayed).
Consideration of buyers' ability to alleviate loses in such ways tends to
38reinforce our conclusions about the superiority of the limited liability
rule when communication is efficient.
Before saying why, let us note that when a buyer can reduce his
losses by doing something after a breath, the courts normally impose a
duty to mitigate losses on him: his allowable claim is only for the losses
he would have suffered had he taken reasonable steps to limit them.
Not being able to collect for losses that he can readily mitigate, a buyer
will be led to mitigate such losses. Since buyers' incentives to mitigate
losses after a breach are dealt with by a specific legal duty, it is only
where courts cannot apply this duty to mitigate losses --forlack of
information about a buyer's opportunity to mitigate losses --that
incentives to mitigate losses would be affected by the limited and
unlimited liability rules. On the other hand, there is no legal duty to
take steps before a breach that would circumscribe its consequences, so
that with regard to steps of this type, the rules of concern to us are
always of relevance.
Now let us ask about the limited and unlimited liability rules for
breach assuming for ease that, before a breach, high valuation buyers
can cheaply --andfrom the efficiency perspective should --takesteps
to reduce their losses to the low level. In effect, high valuation buyers
can convert themselves into low valuation buyers and should do so.
Under the limited liability rule, high valuation buyers would decide
to convert themselves into low valuation buyers. For if a high
valuation buyer does so, he need say nothing to the seller and would
pay the usual, low price. And if a high valuation buyer were to fail to
convert himself into a low valuation buyer, he would be worse off:
either he would identify himself and pay a higher price; or he would
not identify himself and suffer uncompensated losses in the event of
breach.
39Under the unlimited liability rule, a high valuation buyer who
remains a high valuation buyer will be assured of full compensation for
his losses in the event of breach, yet will have to pay the high price
charged to those who do not limit their liability. If a high valuation
buyer converts himself into a low valuation buyer and limits his
liability, he will pay only the low price. He will do this, assuming that
the cost of communication is sufficiently low.
Hence, under the limited liability rule, high valuation buyers have
an incentive to take steps to convert themselves into low valuation
buyers and there is no need for them to communicate; whereas under
the unlimited liability rule, while there is also an incentive for high
valuation buyers to convert themselves into low valuation buyers, they
must communicate in order to limit their liability. The limited liability
rule therefore conserves transactions costs.
C. Sellers' Ignorance about the Existence of High Valuation Buyers
Sellers were assumed in the analysis to be aware of the existence
and, indeed, of the fraction of high valuation buyers in the population.
But in some situations sellers may in fact be unaware of the existence
of high valuation buyers. M explained below, consideration of these
situations strengthens the appeal of the limited liability rule.
Observe first that, under the limited liability rule, a seller's not
contemplating the possibility of the buyer having a high valuation
would have no effect on outcomes. Consider the incentive of a high
valuation buyer to identiQy himself. If he does not identify himself, he
will receive only the low value in the event of breach. (The seller's
ignorance is simply irrelevant because of the protection given to him by
the limited liability rule.) And if he does identify himself in order to be
fully compensated in the event of lireach, the seller will thereby become
40aware of the buyer's high valuation, charge him a higher price, and
raise the level of precautions. Thus, the behavior of buyers (in terms of
their decisions whether to communicate) and the behavior of sellers (in
terms of their decisions about precautions and pricing) would be the
same as in our analysis of the case in which sellers know about the
existence of high valuation buyers.
By contrast, under the unlimited liability rule, sellers' ignorance of
the existence of high valuation buyers would have an effect on
outcomes, and the effect would be inefficient. If sellers are unaware of
the existence of high valuation buyers, they will believe their liability
to be low for all buyers and will charge a low price for all buyers.
Consequently, there will be no incentive for low valuation buyers to
identifr themselves (they would not obtain a discount, given that
sellers believe that all buyers have low valuation). Thus, under the
unlimited liability rule, sellers will never gain information leading
them to use high precautions for high valuation buyers. Furthermore,
the uniform level of precautions that sellers will use in the no-
communication equilibrium that will result will be inefficiently low.
(Sellers will use the level that is appropriate for low valuation buyers
rather than one that is appropriate for the average valuation in the
buyers' population.)
Indeed, the above discussion suggests what can be established --
that,for all cases in which sellers do not contemplate the existence of
high valuation buyers, the limited liability rule is unambiguously
superior to the unlimited liability rule.
This result can be obtained by modifying the argument
establishing Proposition 6. When sellers are ignorant about the
existence of high valuatidn buyers, the only possible outcome under the
unlimited liability rule is a no-communication equilibrium, with sellers
41D. Risk Aversion
Whereas we assumed that buyers and sellers were risk neutral,
they may be risk averse. How, if at all, does this alter our
conclusions? It does not change our central point: that if
communication is efficient, it should be accomplished at least cost, by
high valuation buyers, and that this can occur under the limited
liability rule but cannot occur under the unlimited liability rule.
Risk aversion, however, may influence the strength of the incentive
to communicate. For example, if buyers are risk averse and sellers are
not, then high valuation buyers will have a greater motive to
communicate under the limited liability rule than we said, because they
will want more strongly to avoid the risk of being inadequately
using the low level of precautions x1forall buyers. Under the limited
liability rule, however, there are two possible outcomes. One possible
outcome is a no-communication equilibrium, with sellers using x for
all buyers, an equilibrium which would be identical to the no-
communication equilibrium under the unlimited liability rule. (This
critical step depends on the assumption that sellers are unaware of the
existence of high valuation buyers. Recall that, when sellers are aware
of the existence of such buyers, the no-communication equilibrium
under the unlimited liability is characterized by the intermediate
precautions level x and is for that reason superior to the no-
communication equilibrium under the limited liability rule.)
Alternatively, the unlimited liability rule may produce a
communication equilibrium with different levels of precautions for high
and low valuation buyers. It can be shown that, whenever such a
communication equilibrium occurs, it would be socially preferable to the
no-communication equilibrium with a uniform precautions level of x1.
(High valuation buyers capture all the benefits and bear all the costs of
moving from the no-communication equilibrium to the communication
equilibrium, and would not make such a move unless it produced social
gains.) Thus, the outcome under the limited liability rule will be either
identical or superior to that under the unlimited liability rule, which
establishes the unambiguous dominance of the former rule for the case
in which sellers do not contemplate the existence of high valuation
buyers.
42compensated for loss in the event of breach. Conversely, if sellers are
risk averse and buyers are not, then high valuation buyers will have a
weaker incentive to communicate than we said, because sellers will
raise the price by a greater amount than if they were risk neutral to
compensate themselves for bearing extra risk.
Moreover, risk aversion will also influence the optimality of
communication. As a general matter, one suspects that communication
would be efficient more often than we found, because it would allow a
better allocation of risk as well as a better choice of precautions.
E. Absolute Limitations of Liability
In reality, but not in our model, sellers sometimes place absolute
limits on their liability. That is, even if a buyer identifies himself as
having a very high valuation, he will find the seller unwilling to offer
him a contract with higher liability for breach. How can this be
explained in light of the theory we have been discussing'?
One explanation involves the possibility that --unlikein our
model --thereis little the seller can do to raise the likelihood of
performance, or that it is uneconomic for the seller to change well-
functioning, routinized procedures for a small minority of special
customers. (This may be especially likely for large companies dealing
with a mass of customers.) If so, then a policy of an absolute limitation
on liability would be both efficient and to the seller's advantage:
nothing would be gained by having high valuation buyers announce
themselves because by hypothesis nothing extra would be done for
them; and yet greater, and needless, transaction costs would have been
borne in the process. By imposing an absolute limit on liability, sellers
avoid bearing added transaction costs.
Another explanation, perhaps complementary, is that sellers may be
43risk averse and unwilling to bear liability above some level.
F. Distributional Consequences
While our analysis has focused on issues of incentives and
efficiency, our model also enables us to identify the distributional
consequences of the choice between the two alternative liability rules.
Suppose first that sellers are aware of the existence of high
valuation buyers. In this case, the choice ofrule has no distributional
consequences with regard to sellers. Under either rule, sellers make no
expected profits; their expected revenues always equal their expected
costs.
The choice of rule, however, does have distributional consequences
with regard to buyers. Under the limited liability rule, each type of
buyer receives, in expected value terms, exactly what he pays. A low
valuation buyer or a high valuation buyer who does not identify himself
pays the low price and obtains the low amount in the event of breach
(which the price charged covers). A high valuation buyer who identifies
himself pays more and receives more in the event of breach. In
contrast, under the unlimited liability rule, there may be cross-
subsidization of high valuation buyers by low valuation buyers. This
will happen when low valuation buyers do not identify themselves. In
this case, both low and high valuation buyers pay a price that is based
on the average liability of sellers, and thus, in expected value terms,
low valuation buyers pay more than they receive while high valuation
buyers pay less.
Consider now the situation in which sellers are unaware of the
We have attempted to explain why sellers themselves may
rationally want to impose absolute limitations on liability. Sometimes,
such limitations are imposed by statute.
44existence of high valuation buyers. In this case, low valuation buyers
will pay exactly for what they obtain under either rule. The choice of
rule, however, will now have distributional consequences as between
high valuation buyers and sellers. Under the limited liability rule, high
valuation buyers will pay sellers for what they receive, whereas under
the unlimited liability rule they will not.
In sum, under the limited liability rule, buyers of both types pay for
what they receive whether or not they identify themselves, whereas
under the unlimited liability rule high valuation buyers may be
subsidized by low valuation buyers or by sellers. This observation may
lead one to prefer the limited liability rule over the unlimited liability
rule on distributional grounds.
G. Continuum of Valuations of Performance
Although we assumed in the model that there were only two
valuation buyers which placed on performance, in reality there will be
a whole continuum of valuations. Were we to take this factor into
account in the model, we would find that under the rule limiting
liability to some threshold amount, buyers with valuations exceeding
the threshold would tend to identify themselves in order to assure
themselves of damages for breach fully equal to their valuations, as we
discussed in our model. Yet certain buyers with valuations below the
threshold would also want to identify themselves: those buyers with
valuations far below the threshold would desire to limit their liability
to their true valuations in order to enjoy a reduction in price from the
usual level accorded buyers who do not identify themselves. Similarly,
under the unlimited liability rule, buyers with low valuations would
tend to identify themselves and limit their liability to benefit from price
reductions. Thus, we would come to the same general conclusions, but
45with some variations in detail arising from differences among buyers
with valuations less than the limited liability threshold.
H. Time of Buyer's Notice to Seller
We assumed that the time at which a buyer chooses whether to
communicate with a seller is that of contracting. A question of interest,
however, concerns the possibility that a buyer might communicate
afterwards.37 With regard to the efficient time of communication, it is
clear that the earliest communication of information is best, for this
will give the seller the greatest opportunity to take steps to reduce risk
commensurate with the value of performance. (We suppose throughout
this discussion that the cost of communication is low enough to justifS"
communication.) This implies that, if it is efficient for the buyer to
communicate, he should do this at the time of contracting.
Now consider the limited liability rule, assuming that a high
valuation buyer must communicate at the time of contracting in order
to obtain full damages in the event of breach. Under this rule, high
valuation buyers will communicate at the time of contracting. For
otherwise, as the seller would not be liable for the high valuation, the
buyer would derive no benefit from communication. (Moreover, even if
the buyer communicated later and offered to renegotiate the price, he
might be worse off; for valuable opportunities to reduce risk might have
been forgone; Hadley's shaft might already have been sent, and not
specially labeled.)
If the limited liability rule operated in a different way, so as to
37The opinion in Hadly ,.BaxendyJeholds that communication
must be at the time of contracting. The question of the timing of
communication has been discussed occasionally by commentators, most
notably in Samek (1964).
46apply even if the buyer informed the seller after contracting, then a
buyer's incentives would be perverse. He would wish to keep silent at
the time of contracting, in order to avoid having to pay a higher price.
Only after contracting would he inform the seller of his valuation in
order to assure himself of full compensation in the event of breach.
This would be inefficient, because opportunities to take precautions
might be lost.
We conclude, therefore, that the proper interpretation of the limited
liability rule is that liability be limited unless communication occurs at
the time of contracting.
Turning now to the unlimited liability rule, it should be noted that
low valuation buyers would be induced to reveal their valuation
immediately, because in this way they would obtain a reduction in
price, and the greatest possible one. Hence, information would be
revealed at the efficient time. Therefore, the choice between the
limited liability rule, properly interpreted, and the unlimited rule, is
not affected by considerations of timing of communication of
information; both lead to communication at the time of contracting.
Finally, we should add a slight qualification to our discussion
arising when the buyer learns something that changes the value of
38it is interesting to read Saniek's argument in this light. He urges
that in cases of willful breach a buyer be able to obtain full
compensation for losses if he informs the seller any time before the
breach. Our discussion lends some support to his position: If the only
decision of the seller is whether to commit a willful breach --ifthere
are no prior precautions that he may exercise -.thenfor him to behave
efficiently, it is enough for him to receive the buyer's information any
time before he decides about breach. In practice, however, one
imagines that there will usually be precautions that the seller may
exercise before a willful breach. When so, the rule that Samek
recommends would not be efficient.
47performance after he has contracted. Suppose, for instance, that after
Hadley contracted with Baxendale, he learned that a spare shaft would
not in fact allow his factory to operate. In this case, by assumption, the
buyer cannot have communicated his information at the time of
contracting, but it is efficient for him to communicate with the seller as
soon as possible. And that is what will tend to happen under either
the limited liability rule, properly interpreted, or the unlimited rule.
Under both, the buyer will often be led to report his information, even
though he will have to renegotiate his contract, in order to benefit from
the greatest opportunity for the seller to take added precautions.
I. Foreseeability Limitation in Tort Law
Under tort law, liability tends to be limited to losses that were
reasonably foreseeable; liability may not extend to losses that were
highly improbable or "unforeseeable." Under the rule in Hadleyu.
Baxendale, liability for breach of contract is limited more broadly, in
that losses need not be as unlikely as under tort law in order to be
excluded; it is enough that the victim of the breach did not inform the
other party of the size of his losses. This distinction between limitation
under tort and under contract law has been the subject of discussion,
and it is interesting to make an observation about it in light of our
analysis. In a tort, there generally is no communication between victim
and injurer before an adverse outcome (certainly that will be so when
victim and injurer are strangers). Therefore, as has been noted by
Bishop (1983), limiting the victim's recovery in tort cannot serve the
purpose that it does in contract law, of inducing the potential victim to
communicate his situation to the other party so that hemay act on
that basis. Hence, the affirmative reason for limiting liability in
contract that was elaborated here does not apply in tort.
48V. CONCLUDING REMARK
Letus conclude by assessing the likely importance of the limited
liability rule of Hadley v. Baxendaie to actual outcomes. Our opinion is
as follows. First, we take it as self-evident that it is of importance for
sellers to learn about the value that buyers place on performance when
performance is very valuable, because there is frequently something
cost-justified that can be done to reduce the likelihood of breach.
This point, however, does not by itself constitute a strong argument
in favor of the limited liability rule. As we have stressed, sellers may
obtain information from buyers even under the unlimited liability rule,
because low valuation buyers may elect to identify themselves and limit
the seller's liability. In this case, the advantage we found in the
limited liability rule was not that it alone would enable sellers to learn
what they needed. Rather, it was that transactioncosts wouldbe
saved: only the minority of high valuation buyers communicate under
the limited liability rule, whereas the majority of normal buyers
communicate and limit their liability under the unlimited liability rule.
What is the importance of such savings in transaction costs?
Sometimes, admittedly the savings will not be large. Notably, when
there is substantial discussion of contract terms, the potential savings
in transaction costs is not likely to be significant; for sellers and low
valuation buyers to include a limitation on the seller's liability would
add little friction, because the contracting process would be elaborate
anyway.
The savings in transaction costs afforded by the limited liability
rule do seem to be of real importance, however, with regard to brief,
routinized, and informal transactions (for example, calling to order a
certain minor service at a given time). In these transactions --which
49are vast in number --addingan interaction between buyer and seller
might well constitute a non-negligible inconvenience. (Consider the
consequences of having to add, in most of the brief conversations made
to arrange minor services, a clear understanding that the seller's
liability is limited.) Hence, a rule of unlimited liability might have a
significant efficiency cost whenever it is efficient for sellers to use
differential precautions for low and high valuation buyers. For the
unlimited liability rule would result either in higher transaction costs
for the low valuation buyers and sellers, or in sellers' failing to exercise
differential precautions.
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